The Fall 2026 run does not worsen the inherited DTR/LIR conditional probabilities. Instead, v12 asks an additional question: how likely is the world to follow the reform path at all? The answer is the central finding of this run.
Material, coordinated reforms across multiple systems before pressures compound.
Acceleration continues while governance, distribution and institutional adaptation lag behind.
The conditional scenarios answer “what happens if leaders DTR or LIR?” The new blended view also asks “how likely are leaders to choose each posture?”
| Horizon | Full empowerment | Managed disruption | Uneven transition | Lost control |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2030 | 0.3% | 3.6% | 25.5% | 70.6% |
| 2040 | 0.7% | 1.9% | 10.3% | 87.1% |
| 2050 | 1.4% | 0.6% | 3.6% | 94.4% |
Sensitivity check: even if DTR is raised to 15%, Lost Control remains 67.9% in 2030, 84.7% in 2040 and 92.1% in 2050.
The world economy is not collapsing. The problem is that productive capacity, institutional capacity and diffusion are not advancing together.
Major systems show better adequacy and storage, but connection queues, fast load growth and infrastructure constraints remain substantial.
Surveillance and preparedness capacity remain substantial, but the inherited Health Surveillance Flag is not yet cleared.
Teacher AI use is visible, but capability and assessment adaptation remain highly uneven and far behind deployment.
Operational AI accountability is becoming real in some jurisdictions, while the wider institutional trust environment remains weak and mixed.
Shipping and supply networks are adapting better than governments are coordinating. Deliberation is growing faster than enforceable compact capacity.
Advanced compute ownership remains highly concentrated and meaningful productive access is geographically narrow.
IMF growth remains resilient and global labour productivity is positive, but v12 classifies the current pattern as concentrated growth: the productive engine is functioning while gains, compute and capability remain unevenly distributed.
The model therefore refuses to equate GDP or productivity growth with Full Empowerment.
Household financial inclusion has improved, but labour’s share of global income remains weak and shared-prosperity progress is insufficient. The gate requires improvement across at least two dimensions without material deterioration elsewhere.
At Fall 2026, that test is not met.
Flags change how readily positive evidence can be credited.
Geopolitical risk remains elevated. No sustained reversal is visible.
The new baseline improves visibility but does not yet clear the inherited surveillance flag.
Leading indicators softened, but IMF growth evidence does not corroborate a broad downturn.
Distribution is weak, but access-to-work evidence has not deteriorated enough to trigger the new two-family rule.
v12 is a measurement upgrade, not a retrospective rewrite of the Spring result.
Government effectiveness, corruption, political freedom and direct survey trust sit in a structural Trust Basket, separate from operational AI accountability.
A Macro Performance Panel tracks real GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and labour productivity, then reads them jointly with diffusion rather than assuming growth equals empowerment.
v12 replaces broadband speed proxies with concentration of advanced compute and geographic availability of usable AI compute.
A Participation Stress Flag separates labour-market access from macro stress, while the Wealth-Diffusion Gate is tied to measurable household security, labour share and shared prosperity.
The model finally distinguishes a desirable DTR pathway from the probability that leaders will actually choose it.
The public page is deliberately readable. The full technical record is available separately.
The Fall run uses public-access evidence from established international statistical agencies, regulators, system operators and widely used independent datasets. Core sources include the IMF, World Bank, ILOSTAT, OECD/OECD.AI, WHO, IEA and major electricity-system operators, UNCTAD, Freedom House, Transparency International, public Gallup/OECD trust aggregates, the Caldara-Iacoviello Geopolitical Risk dataset and public Epoch AI compute estimates. Estimated datasets are explicitly flagged and given less evidential weight. No private telemetry or proprietary data are used.